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INTRODUCTION
Professor Anita Bernstein opens her book, The Common Law Inside the
Female Body, with a startling “strange bedfellows” argument: William
Blackstone and modern American feminists want the same thing. “The
common law,” she argues “contains precepts and doctrines that strengthen
the freedom of individuals; the feminist struggle against the subjugation of
women pursues liberty.”1 Can this be the same Blackstone who articulated
the doctrine of coverture and the severe impediments it imposed on the
liberty of married women? His pronouncement that “the husband and wife
are one person in law”—and that one is the husband—is the centerpiece of a
doctrine that deprived married women of a panoply of civil rights like buying
property, entering into contracts, and owning their own wages.2 These
disabilities were lifted by statutes known as the “Married Women’s Property
Acts,” but some impediments persisted into the twentieth century.3 But by
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1
ANITA BERNSTEIN, THE COMMON LAW INSIDE THE FEMALE BODY 1 (2019).
2
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442 (Callaghan & Co. 1899).
3
The disabilities of coverture were lifted in waves by states beginning around 1850. See Richard H.
Chused, Married Women’s Property Law: 1800–1850, 71 GEO. L.J. 1359, 1359, 1398 (1983). The right
to own one’s own wages was the last one secured by women. See Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The
First Woman’s Rights Claims Concerning Wives’ Household Labor, 1850–1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073,
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the end of the book, Bernstein has made a compelling argument that common
law principles, despite an inauspicious start, can “liberate women.”4 Indeed,
there is little if anything in those principles that deprives women of the same
rights as men. The common law may have “proceeded as if only men could
enjoy its opportunities,” but that, she argues, is due to a “historical condition
now supplanted.”5
Once women became equal participants in civil society as well as in the
justice system, there ceased to exist any basis for restricting the benefit of
common-law principles to men.6 And, oh boy, the common law contains
some juicy stuff that really could be deployed to advance the cause of gender
equality. This Essay will consider and evaluate Bernstein’s argument that the
common law supports a virtually unfettered right to terminate a pregnancy.
It will situate her argument against the backdrop of the constitutional right
of abortion, which has been the primary lens through which women’s
reproductive rights have been viewed. The Essay will then consider the
newly composed Supreme Court and the threat it portends to reproductive
rights. It concludes by suggesting that the common law, as Bernstein
understands it, could come to the rescue of women and their full humanity.
I.

THE RIGHT TO FAVOR ONESELF

Bernstein’s overarching point is that while the common law embraces
a belief in negative liberty that does not guarantee individuals receive
anything “to give them the freedom to flourish,” it empowers them to “reject
invasion and intrusion.”7 What this amounts to, in Bernstein’s words, is a
right of “condoned self-regard.”8 She further explains:
We may put ourselves first, in other words. Individuals may favor themselves
and what they think are their own interests over the demands that another person
makes. Only if they have done something that forces them to subordinate what
they want for themselves must they yield to the wishes of another individual. In
this design, found pervasively in the common law, condoned self-regard is the
rule and compelled self-abnegation the exception.9

Chapter Five is devoted to unwanted pregnancy—specifically, the
application of indisputable common law principles to abortion. At the risk of
1083 (1994); Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives’ Rights to
Earnings, 1860–1930, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127, 2138 (1994).
4
BERNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 1.
5
Id.
6
Id. at 2.
7
Id. at 7.
8
Id. at 8.
9
Id.
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causing Blackstone to turn over in his grave, let’s consider Bernstein’s
bottom line: The common law clearly supports a woman’s unfettered access
to abortion for no reason other than that she does not desire to be pregnant.10
The chapter revolves around the unwanted “Zef,” her shorthand for an in
utero zygote-embryo-fetus, a life form that changes identity as it develops
from blastocyst to baby.11 Does a woman have the right to forcefully remove
the Zef from her body? If the answer is no, she is forced to give birth and
forced, unless and until she relinquishes the child for adoption, to become a
mother. The harm of forced birth should be obvious—the pain and risk of
pregnancy and childbirth to her life and health, the invasive medical
monitoring, and the many costs and potential harms of becoming a mother
against one’s will.12 The consequences of forced birth take a variety of
forms—from precipitating intimate partner violence to costing one her job—
and can last a lifetime (or shorten it).13 Abortion, on the other hand, is safe
and effective in most cases14—a woman is fourteen times more likely to die
from giving birth than from having an abortion.15 The question, then, is
whether the pregnant woman has the right to avoid this harm by terminating
the pregnancy and evicting the Zef from the inside of her body. Without the
protective housing of the uterus, and the biological support the pregnant
woman provides, the Zef cannot survive.

10

See id. at 152–55.
Id. at 142–43.
12
Some of these harms, and their disproportionate impact on poor women and women of color, are
explored in Joanna L. Grossman, The Seeds of Early Childhood, 71 FLA. L. REV. F. 117, 127–28 (2019);
see also GUTTMACHER INST., UNINTENDED PREGNANCY IN THE UNITED STATES (Jan. 2019),
https://www.guttmacher.org/fact-sheet/unintended-pregnancy-united-states
[https://perma.cc/K9ERGR5J].
13
BERNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 144–45.
14
See, e.g., NAT’L ACADS. SCI., ENG’G, & MED., THE SAFETY AND QUALITY OF ABORTION CARE IN
THE UNITED STATES (2018), https://doi.org/10.17226/24950 [https://perma.cc/G238-U24H]; PLANNED
PARENTHOOD, How Safe Is the Abortion Pill?, https://www.plannedparenthood.org/learn/abortion/theabortion-pill/how-safe-is-the-abortion-pill [https://perma.cc/28TA-XT8K] (“Medication abortion is very
safe. Serious problems are rare, but like all medical procedures, there can be some risks.”). Safety and
legality are highly interrelated. See Bela Ganatra et al., Global, Regional, and Subregional Classification
of Abortions by Safety, 2010–14: Estimates from a Bayesian Hierarchical Model, 390 LANCET 2372,
2372
(2017),
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(17)31794-4
[https://perma.cc/Y7FL-9XX6]
(concluding that abortion is performed safely in nine out of ten cases in countries where it is legal, but
only one out of four cases where it is banned or severely restricted).
15
BERNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 144; see also Elizabeth G. Raymond & David A. Grimes, The
Comparative Safety of Legal Induced Abortion and Childbirth in the United States, 119 OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 215, 217 (2012); Warren M. Hern, Opinion, Pregnancy Kills. Abortion Saves Lives., N.Y.
TIMES (May 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/21/opinion/alabama-law-abortion.html
[https://perma.cc/BPQ6-HD4H].
11
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II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO SEEK AN ABORTION
The Constitution has been the primary framework through which
abortion rights have been developed in the U.S. Since 1973, when the
Supreme Court decided in Roe v. Wade16 that a woman has the right to
terminate a pre-viability pregnancy, most debates about abortion have hung
on Roe and its ability to withstand relentless attacks in the courts. At the time
Roe was decided, abortion was criminalized by a majority of U.S. states.17
Those bans were not age-old. Many were enacted in the middle of the
nineteenth century, replacing a common law standard followed both in
England and in U.S. states that permitted abortions before “quickening”—
the moment when the pregnant woman can first feel fetal movement (around
sixteen to eighteen weeks gestation).18 The criminal bans that took hold
typically prohibited all abortions, but punished those on farther along
pregnancies more severely than earlier ones; the only standard exception was
for abortions necessary to save the life of the pregnant woman.19 And under
these laws, it was the doctors who were criminalized, not the pregnant
women.20
A move to liberalize abortion laws had begun prior to the decision in
Roe. In 1962, the American Law Institute recommended that states loosen
abortion restrictions by creating a category of justifiable abortions.21
Between 1966 and 1972, a third of the states changed their laws to create at
least a small category for legal abortion.22 When Roe was decided, four states
had repealed their bans completely.23 Writing for the majority, Justice
Blackmun declared that the right to privacy under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause encompassed the right to terminate a

16

410 U.S. 113, 164–65 (1973).
Id. at 118.
18
JANET FARRELL BRODIE, CONTRACEPTION AND ABORTION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA
253–54 (1994); JAMES C. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL
POLICY 8 (1978).
19
ROSEMARY NOSSIFF, BEFORE ROE: ABORTION POLICY IN THE STATES 31–33 (2001).
20
On this complex history of abortion and punishment, see Mary Ziegler, Some Form of Punishment:
Penalizing Women for Abortion, 26 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 735, 740 (2018) (noting that although
some laws technically permitted pregnant women to be prosecuted for soliciting or conspiring with the
abortion provider, “few women went to prison for having an abortion”).
21
Model Penal Code § 230.3 (AM. LAW INST. 1962); Roe, 410 U.S. at 139–40; see also LESLIE J.
REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION WAS A CRIME: WOMEN, MEDICINE, AND LAW IN THE UNITED STATES, 1867–
1973, at 220–22 (1997).
22
Roe, 410 U.S. at 139–40.
23
See id. at 140 n.37 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 11.15.060 (1970); HAW. REV. STAT. § 453-16 (Supp.
1971); N.Y. PENAL L. § 125.05, subd. 3 (McKinney Supp. 1972–1973); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.02.060
to 9.02.080 (Supp. 1972)); see also NOSSIFF, supra note 19, at 41.
17
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pregnancy before a certain point.24 The Court held specifically that a fetus is
not a person for constitutional purposes and does not have rights that need to
be balanced against the woman’s own rights.25 The state, according to the
Court, has no interest in protecting fetal life during the first trimester, but
acquires one when the fetus reaches viability.26 This ruling effectively
invalidated most abortion laws in the United States, even in states that had
liberalized their laws, but fell short of legalizing abortion regardless of
circumstance.
In the decades that followed Roe, the Supreme Court revisited and
reframed the right of abortion as the right to terminate a pre-viability
pregnancy without undue burden from the government.27 The anti-abortion
movement went through different strategies—violence, attacks on funding,
and indirect attacks on providers and facilities that made it hard for many
women to access abortions.28 There were wins and losses for each side—for
example, the Supreme Court upheld restrictions on government funding for
abortions but invalidated many regulations that forced clinics to close with
no offsetting benefit to women’s health.29 Throughout decades of battle,
abortion rights remained entirely contingent on the Supreme Court’s
willingness to toe the line.
Today, constitutional abortion rights hang by a thread, as newly
appointed Justices Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh portend a stark

24

Roe, 410 U.S. at 164–65.
Id. at 158 (“[T]he word ‘person,’ as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the
unborn.”).
26
Id. at 163–64.
27
See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 510 U.S. 1309, 1313 (1994) (considering
the constitutionality of a wide range of abortion restrictions). For a comprehensive history, see MARY
ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE: THE LOST HISTORY OF THE ABORTION DEBATE (2015).
28
On clinic violence, see Mireille Jacobson & Heather Royer, Aftershocks: The Impact of Clinic
Violence on Abortion Services (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16603, 2010),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w16603 [https://perma.cc/VE6L-YP7V] (noting that between 1973 and
2003, abortion providers in the United States were the targets of over 300 acts of extreme violence,
including arson, bombings, murders, and butyric acid attacks); David A. Grimes et al., An Epidemic of
Antiabortion Violence in the United States, 165 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1263 (1991),
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/000293789190346S?via%3Dihub
[https://perma.cc/6C4S-VD27] (noting that during the study period, 1977–1988, the National Abortion
Federation reported the following violent acts against clinics: 222 clinic invasions, 220 acts of clinic
vandalism, 216 bomb threats, 65 death threats, 46 assault and batteries, 20 burglaries, and 2 kidnappings).
On the shift toward indirect regulation and funding cuts, see Mary Ziegler, After Life: Governmental
Interests and the New Antiabortion Incrementalism, 73 U. MIAMI L. REV. 78, 85–86 (2018).
29
See, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2318 (2016) (striking down two
provisions of a Texas law that imposed an undue burden on the right to abortion by forcing clinics to
close); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 311 (1980) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to the Hyde
Amendment, which withdrew federal funding even for “medically necessary abortions”).
25
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rightward shift.30 This has created opportunities for states to restrict
abortion—multiple states have passed near or total bans in the last few
months in the hopes of bringing about a post-Roe world.31 But at the same
time, other states have done the exact opposite—they have passed strong
statutory protections for abortions that will maintain or even expand
women’s reproductive rights when and if the constitutional bottom falls
out.32 The question is not whether abortion rights will be protected, but when,
how severely, and by what means they will be curtailed, at least as a
constitutional matter. The records of the new Justices on sexual and
reproductive rights support this prediction.33 The battle over abortion has
become more divisive, and the polar movements have drifted further apart.
30

See, e.g., Mark Berman, Trump Promised Judges Who Would Overturn Roe v. Wade, WASH. POST
(Mar. 21, 2017, 9:02 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2017/live-updates/trump-whitehouse/neil-gorsuch-confirmation-hearings-updates-and-analysis-on-the-supreme-court-nominee/trumppromised-judges-who-would-overturn-roe-v-wade [https://perma.cc/6YLB-Y8NM]; Mark Joseph Stern,
Brett Kavanaugh Just Declared War on Roe v. Wade, SLATE (Feb. 7, 2019, 11:15 PM),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/02/brett-kavanaugh-june-medical-services-louisiana-johnroberts.html [https://perma.cc/Q5G6-KTJL].
31
See, e.g., Michelle Goldberg, Opinion, The Abortion Divide Gets Deeper, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/29/opinion/abortion-heartbeat-ban-georgia.html
[https://perma.cc/LPT6-8AS9]; Sabrina Tavernise, ‘The Time Is Now’: States are Rushing to Restrict
Abortion,
or
to
Protect
It,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
15,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/15/us/abortion-laws-2019.html [https://perma.cc/AY34-2FR8].
32
See Quoctrung Bui et al., Where Roe v. Wade Has the Biggest Effect, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/07/18/upshot/roe-v-wade-abortion-maps-plannedparenthood.html [https://perma.cc/VG8P-8DXR] (noting that West Coast and Northeastern states would
still protect abortion without Roe).
33
Justice Gorsuch wrote a concurring opinion in the lower court opinion in Hobby Lobby, in which
he argued for a position that would have permitted even greater incursions into the contraceptive mandate
than ultimately permitted by the Supreme Court. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114,
1156–57 (10th Cir. 2013) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). As a D.C. Circuit judge, Justice Kavanaugh issued a
decision that would have permitted the federal government to obstruct a detained immigrant minor’s
access to abortion even after a Texas court had granted her permission to proceed. He was reversed by
the D.C. Circuit en banc. Garza v. Hargan, 874 F.3d 735, 736 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (en banc); see also Dahlia
Lithwick & Jed Shugerman, Kavanaugh Already Has One of the Clearest Records Against Roe of Any
Recent Supreme Court Nominee, SLATE (July 18, 2018, 2:43 PM), https://slate.com/news-andpolitics/2018/07/brett-kavanaugh-has-a-clear-record-against-roe-v-wade.html [https://perma.cc/9SD7EADB] (outlining and discussing Justice Kavanaugh’s prior decisions in cases that implicated Roe v.
Wade). In June Medical Services, L.L.C. v. Gee, Justice Kavanaugh dissented from an order staying
enforcement of a set of abortion restrictions in Louisiana pending review on the merits and, in an unusual
move, wrote a dissenting opinion. 139 S. Ct. 663 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (order granting stay).
Even though the restrictions are virtually identical to those struck down by the Supreme Court in 2016 in
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstadt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016), Justice Kavanaugh would have permitted
the restrictions to take effect pending review, despite significant evidence in the record that the restrictions
would cause all but one doctor in the State of Louisiana to cease providing abortion care. This action was
widely understood as Justice Kavanaugh’s declaration of war on abortion rights. See, e.g., Stern, supra
note 30. The Supreme Court has just agreed to review the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in June Medical. June
Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Gee, 905 F.3d 787 (5th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 140 S. Ct. 35 (2019) (consolidating
cases).
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The shifting terrain presents new challenges, making it the perfect time to
consider Bernstein’s call of the common law to arms.
III. THE ROLE OF THE COMMON LAW IN PROTECTING ABORTION RIGHTS
From the perspective of a pregnant woman, an unwanted pregnancy
causes harm, and termination of that pregnancy can be accomplished safely
and effectively. Those are the (entirely provable) premises from which
Bernstein begins her argument that the common law protects a woman’s
right to terminate an unwanted pregnancy.34 Remaining pregnant is worth the
immense physical, emotional, financial, and social costs “only if one wishes
the first-time parenthood or the larger family that will follow this
pregnancy—or, for the minority of pregnancies that involve surrogacy, if the
pregnant person is receiving acceptable compensation.”35 The Supreme
Court has recognized that the deprivation of access to abortion “amounts to
a real injury,”36 but does the common law?
The common law, Bernstein argues, protects a general right to refuse
the things we “Do Not Want.”37 There are exceptions to this rule—consent,
undertaking of responsibility, and criminal punishment—but Bernstein
argues persuasively that none are applicable to the condition of unwanted
pregnancy.38 Engaging in sex, she argues, cannot be equated with consent to
pregnancy, given the possibility of rape, failed contraceptives, fraud about
contraceptives or fertility, as well as the sheer unlikelihood that any one act
of sex will so result. Likewise, for the same reason, a pregnant woman cannot
be treated as having undertaken responsibility for the Zef, at least not in all
circumstances. Moreover, the common law provides that “an obligor may
abandon an undertaking when fulfilling it would demand too much of her.”39
Pregnancy and birth surely fit that bill. Pregnancy can trigger or reveal lifealtering or life-threatening situations that would make even a stoic wish to
abandon course.40 The final possibility is that she must remain pregnant as a
form of criminal punishment, but the status of being pregnant does not itself
prove a sufficient act or mental state to warrant criminal liability, and in most
cases, the underlying sex is not a crime. And even if it was, Bernstein
explains, “[f]orced gestation, parturition, and motherhood are incoherent

34
35
36
37
38
39
40

BERNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 143–47.
Id. at 147.
Id.
Id. at 33–35.
Id. at 147–50.
Id. at 149.
See, e.g., supra notes 11–15 and accompanying text.

155

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW ONLINE

retribution for whatever misconduct the pregnancy is understood to
manifest.”41
If the woman’s right to refuse things she Does Not Want is intact, then
the remaining question is: with what means? In other words, can she enforce
her right to refuse something she Does Not Want by terminating the Zef? It
does not even seem like a close call under standard common law principles,
and here’s the punchline: of course she can. Bernstein explains thoroughly
why the common law precept that permits one to repel an invader with deadly
force supports unfettered access to abortion.42 The principle gives people an
“interest in the integrity and safety of not only their lives and health but also
the physical space in which they live.”43 As already discussed, the Zef poses
a serious risk of bodily harm, which is sufficient under the common law
standard to justify a lethal response. This is so even when the target of the
force bears no blame for the invasion (the Zef), and when the response is
carried out by someone other than the one threatened (the medical provider).
The “castle doctrine,” which permits a person to take severe measures to
protect her home from an invader, only reinforces the common law’s support
for abortion to repel an invading Zef.44 It is not an exaggeration to say that
most readers will be completely convinced by the end of this section of the
book that the common law supports a right to abortion far broader than the
Constitution guarantees. And that this would be true whether you believe the
Zef to be a person or not. After all, how could it be that a person can kill a
living, breathing, fully grown human to protect his home, but another person
cannot protect her own body from an unwanted invader?
Bernstein further examines a second precept of the common law—that
a person may “withhold benevolence and favors” from others, even when
they would require little effort and pose no risk.45 As anyone who has
completed first-year Torts will remember, there is no duty to rescue another
person. You can discover a helpless baby on the train tracks and just leave it
there, potential lethal harm be damned.46
This all invites Bernstein’s observation: “If Ye Olde Common Law
gives individuals a right to rid themselves of pregnancy, one would have
expected to hear the news before now.”47 While the common law has

41

BERNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 150.
Id. at 151–56.
43
Id. at 151.
44
See id. at 152–53.
45
Id. at 156–60.
46
On the lack of a duty to rescue under tort law, see Ernest J. Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue,
90 YALE L.J. 247, 247 (1980).
47
BERNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 160.
42
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“consistently had no trouble” recognizing the right of people to repel
intruders or withhold favors, “it has been less able to perceive a pregnant
individual as a holder of these common law rights.”48 Bernstein explains that
this is, in part, a reflection of science and technology: before safe and
effective methods of abortion were perfected, which did not happen until the
twentieth century, an abortion prohibition could have been justified under
the common law as a sort of “harm reduction” principle.49 This, she points
out, was the focus of early feminists who opposed abortion and whose views
have been twisted and co-opted by the modern anti-abortion movement.50
The more concerning explanation for the lack of recognition of the
common law’s application to abortion, which Bernstein captures in a single
sentence, is this: “Applying common law doctrines to abortion calls for
willingness to consider the pregnant person a person.”51 Therein lies the rub.
This is a general problem with the law, especially when it comes to sexual
and reproductive health. The law is replete with instances in which the failure
to recognize women’s full humanity relegates them to second-class citizens.
One need only skim modern abortion case law to see that even when courts
purport to be protecting a woman’s right to abortion, they do not treat her as
a functioning, independent person—and certainly not as one who possesses
the long-recognized right to repel invaders. The Supreme Court has upheld
a wide variety of abortion restrictions that question a woman’s power to
make decisions about her own body and healthcare, including mandatory
ultrasounds, waiting periods, counseling with scientific misinformation, and
so on.52
In perhaps the most egregious example, the Supreme Court upheld a
federal ban on a particular method of second-trimester abortions in order to

48

Id. at 160–61.
Id. at 165.
50
Id. The Susan B. Anthony List, for example, is a pro-life advocacy group that operates under the
name of a famous feminist and suffragist, even though many historians believe this is a misappropriation
of women’s history and a misrepresentation of Anthony’s position on abortion. See SUSAN B. ANTHONY
LIST, https://www.sba-list.org [https://perma.cc/AL4S-UV7X]; see also Tracy A. Thomas,
Misappropriating Women’s History in the Law and Politics of Abortion, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 2
(2012); Craig Medred, ‘Sarah Palin Is No Susan B. Anthony’, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (July 6, 2016),
https://www.adn.com/politics/article/sarah-palin-no-susan-b-anthony/2010/05/18
[https://perma.cc/J5KK-5HEP] (describing a blog post, on a now-defunct blog, in which Ann Gordon and
Lynn Sherr argue that the pro-life movement has distorted Anthony’s attitudes toward abortion to “bolster
[its] own cause”).
51
BERNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 161.
52
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 510 U.S. 1309, 1313 (1994).
49
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protect women from their own regret (assumed, not proven).53 As Justice
Kennedy wrote,
It is self-evident that a mother who comes to regret her choice to abort must
struggle with grief more anguished and sorrow more profound when she learns,
only after the event, what she once did not know: that she allowed a doctor to
pierce the skull and vacuum the fast-developing brain of her unborn child, a
child assuming the human form.54

According to the Court, the woman here is a mother (without having
given birth), she is bonded to an unborn child, and she is suffering.55
Abortions seem only, in the eyes of the Supreme Court, to involve the
“abortion doctor,” “the fetus,” and “the cervix.”56 There is no fully human
woman at the center, where she should be. Imagine what self-defense
criminal cases would look like if we described men in such terms when they
shoot an intruder who has dared penetrate their castle? Don’t bother, because
judges never do. We do not deprive a man of his self-defense argument out
of fear that he might regret or feel conflicted about shooting an unarmed,
potentially harmless intruder. We just envision him standing up for his
rights—strong, fearless, determined, and unfazed by the moral complexity
of his act.
CONCLUSION
Will the common law come to the rescue of women as the Supreme
Court falls away from them and their rights? One limitation of the common
law, which Bernstein acknowledges, is that it can be abrogated by statute. It
is thus not a force against the legislatures that have already demonstrated
their antipathy to abortion rights and their plans for a post-Roe world. And
perhaps it adds nothing in the states that have taken the initiative to use
legislative power to protect and expand reproductive rights. The
constitutional protection for a woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy has
been the glue that keeps the opposing states from drifting too far away. The
right to abortion cannot, of course, be abrogated by statute, state or federal.
53

See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) (“While we find no reliable data to measure
the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their choice to abort
the infant life they once created and sustained.”).
54
Id. at 159–60.
55
On this treatment of women in abortion law, see Joanna L. Grossman & Linda McClain, Gonzales
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But it can be abandoned by the Supreme Court, and it may well be in the
near future. While it is not clear that the common law will be the backstop
when this happens, it could be used to focus our attention on the most
important question: Are women people, too?
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